Written in Madrid, after standing before Picasso’s Guernica. My thesis: the Burkinabè love democracy but feel uneasy about defending it. Afrobarometer data and the transition charters of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger show a real attachment to democratic values. But democracy is seen as imposed by the West, and defending it means appearing to side with the former coloniser: a cognitive dissonance. Yet my research shows that one can defend it and fight terrorism at the same time.
I am writing to you from Madrid, where I took the time to visit the Reina Sofía museum. There, before Guernica by the Spanish painter Pablo Picasso, I felt once again the force of a cry against war, against the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, who ruled Spain from 1939 to 1975, and, between the lines, a reminder that democracy always ends up, sooner or later, defeating fascism and autocratic regimes. Looking at this canvas, I thought back on my own path: that of a Burkinabè who questions the place of democracy in a country still marked by colonial legacies, outside injunctions and the temptation of force.
My thesis is that the Burkinabè love democracy but feel uneasy about defending it. This thesis contains ideas that line up in order, which I must first draw out to make the reasoning and the sequence of facts easier to follow. I will therefore structure my reflection here as a series of arguments.
Argument 1 — The Burkinabè love democracy
This is the starting point and the basic idea of my thesis, which I have tried and still try to share with the people I meet. One important point to clarify is that democracy is not only elections; democracy includes very important elements: individual freedom, the right to life and to protection, the right not to be threatened for one’s opinions, freedom of association and of assembly, checks and balances on the executive, the right to choose one’s leaders in a free and transparent election, and so on. Democracy is therefore a social revolution that breaks the monopoly of control over the state apparatus and political decision-making. The birth of democracy, for instance in ancient Greece, as Alfred Croiset, the French Hellenist, shows in his writings on ancient democracies, proves that democracy is the fruit of a social revolution in which the eupatrids gradually lost power to the masses. In short, for more on the origins of democracy, I recommend Croiset’s book.
Democracy, then, in its very essence, is a social revolution whose aim is to free the genius of those left behind and to take power back from the aristocratic elite. This does not mean that democracy, like any revolutionary project, has no limits. Just as the revolution conceived by Karl Marx, the German philosopher and economist, and later by Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Russian revolution of 1917, who created the form and structure of the revolution, became in the hands of Joseph Stalin, his successor, an instrument of repression (see Lenin: A Revolutionary Life by Christopher Read, the British historian of Russia), so democracy has its limits. Many democratic states today, under cover of democracy, have led the world towards catastrophe, towards wars. Western democracies have even imposed dictatorial regimes. The inconsistency of Western democracies in the world naturally deals a blow to democracy, certainly, but democracy goes beyond the actors who are its poor ambassadors. If we were to look into the revolutionaries’ cupboard as well, we would dig up as many corpses as in the democracies. Incidentally, revolution is Western; it is not endogenous to Africa, any more than democracy is. Cheikh Anta Diop, the Senegalese historian and anthropologist, showed that African social structure had not generated enough tension to lay the foundations of a revolution as happened in Western societies. The caste structure, different from the class structure, was much more stable. Anyway, it is the holidays, and I encourage young people to read the fine bibliography of Diop and of some Marxists such as Jean Suret-Canale, the French geographer and historian of Africa, and also to visit the blog of Valère Somé, the Burkinabè sociologist and companion of Thomas Sankara. So democracy and revolution, as concepts conceived and implanted, are Western. But their core ideas — releasing the energy within the people, allowing them to take control of the running of their own city — can travel beyond cultures. That is why Africa’s political history contains elements of respect for human rights, freedom of thought and of association, within the institutional framework that was the precolonial African framework. Let us close this parenthesis by saying that the false debate over “democracy is imported” applies equally to revolution. Let us focus instead on the content of these ways of running our states, and on how we can draw out what is essential to wrest power from a minority and return it to the people, through strong institutions and mechanisms of control.
As I was saying, the Burkinabè love democracy, for the following reasons. Afrobarometer data show that over the last twenty years, when Burkinabè were asked whether they preferred democracy to any other form of government, or non-democratic regimes, or were indifferent, they showed a clear preference for democracy. This choice is not random, since they also had the alternative or the neutral option. The deliberate choice of democracy shows that people prefer it. We will not discuss here the quality of the data collected (which some have sought to highlight in order to call the data into question).
On the political side, I looked at the websites of the governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, to see what the current leaders think of democracy and whether the authorities clearly denounce it. My first observation is that all the current regimes, led by the military, despite constitutional revisions made at times when they were free to make political choices, under no constraint from ECOWAS, still less from international institutions (I hope), clearly retain democratic values in their transition charters.
I then went through the charters and tried to note the elements related to democratic values. There have certainly been changes to the charters and to the constitution, for reasons of the moment and for political motives, but in the spirit of the texts there is no fundamental rejection of democracy, even if there are visible and clear breaches. I decided to focus my analysis on aspects that capture the spirit of democracy in the constitution, while leaving it to constitutional scholars to take a deeper look at the democratic violations in the various documents. Here, I will not take the risk of posing as a constitutional scholar, still less as a lawyer. A few extracts.
Niger:
“Art. 3: Niger is a unitary state, a Republic one and indivisible, sovereign, democratic and social.”
“Art. 13: All Nigeriens are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties.”
“Art. 34: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, opinion, expression, conscience, religion and worship. The State guarantees the free exercise of worship and the expression of beliefs.”
Mali:
“Article 1: The human person is sacred and inviolable. Every individual has the right to life, liberty, security and the integrity of their person.”
“Article 2: All Malians are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties. Any discrimination based on social origin, colour, language, race, sex, religion or political opinion is prohibited.”
“Article 4: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, worship, opinion, expression and creation, within the law.”
Transition Charter: Law No. 2022-001 of 25 February 2022 revising the Transition Charter.
“New Article 10: The President of the Transition takes office no more than seven (07) days after being appointed. Before taking office, he swears the following oath before the Supreme Court: ‘I swear before God and the Malian people to preserve faithfully the republican system, to respect and ensure respect for the Constitution, the Transition Charter and the law, to carry out my duties in the higher interest of the people, to preserve democratic gains, to guarantee national unity, the independence of the homeland and the integrity of the national territory. I solemnly commit on my honour to do everything to achieve African unity.’”
Burkina Faso, preamble to the Transition Charter:
“Considering our attachment to the values of integrity, patriotism, justice and sovereignty; Considering the need to promote popular democracy and good governance; Adhering to the cultural values and democratic principles contained in the international and regional legal instruments to which Burkina Faso has subscribed.”
“Article 4: … The President of the transition is eligible for the presidential, legislative and municipal elections that will be held to end the transition.”
“Article 6: The President of Faso is invested by the Constitutional Council. During the investiture ceremony, the President of Faso swears the following oath: ‘I swear before the Burkinabè People and on my honour to preserve, respect, ensure respect for and defend the Constitution, the Transition Charter and the laws, and to do everything to guarantee justice for all the inhabitants of Burkina Faso.’”
Only Articles 34, 37 and 147 of the Constitution were amended by the transition; the rest is therefore what will be upheld:
“Article 1: All Burkinabè are born free and equal in rights. All have an equal claim to enjoy all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution. Discrimination of all kinds, in particular on grounds of race, ethnicity, region, colour, sex, language, religion, caste, political opinion, wealth and birth, is prohibited.”
“Article 8: Freedom of opinion, freedom of the press and the right to information are guaranteed. Everyone has the right to express and disseminate their opinions within the framework of the laws and regulations in force.”
These elements, without being exhaustive, aim to show that in the spirit of the legal texts, democracy, democratic values, and the need to respect rights and individual freedoms are very much present, despite radical, anti-democratic official rhetoric. If we agree that the texts do not call democratic principles and values into question — even if violations are visible — we could speak here of a hybrid regime or an anocracy. So how are we to understand the popular discourse rejecting democracy, which does not match the provisions of the texts? This raises the question: why this paradox? And indeed, is it a paradox?
Argument 2 — A democracy seen as imposed
The Burkinabè cannot defend democracy because they believe it was imposed on Africa and on the Burkinabè. It is clear that after the La Baule speech, delivered in 1990 by François Mitterrand, then President of France, an offensive by Western countries, through aid conditionality, imposed democracy on African countries. The idea behind the will to democratise the world comes from democratic peace theory. This theory holds that democratic countries are less inclined to go to war with one another, and that non-democratic regimes are more bellicose. So, to reduce wars in the world, the world had to be democratised (unfortunately, democratic countries have started many wars, which calls this theory into question in practice). Once democracy is perceived and presented as an invention and an instrument of the imperialism of the world’s democracies, it inevitably becomes a Western system, a system embracing Western values and principles whose aim is to maintain political and cultural domination over dominated and colonised peoples: a kind of soft power.
Argument 3 — Breaking free from the former executioner
The Burkinabè, like the African, wants to be free of domination, claims sovereignty and cherishes it. This is palpable and clearly stated in the charters of the various countries. So, from whom or from what ideology do Africans, and the Burkinabè in particular, want to free themselves? The Burkinabè’s freedom is directed against the colonial system that lay at the root of the fall and the loss of sovereignty. That is why the Burkinabè are more comfortable accepting the soft power and the gradual, cultural domination of Russia rather than that of France, for example. Both systems are non-endogenous; Russia has no more cultural link with Burkina than France does, apart from the colonial fact. The question is therefore fundamentally rooted in feeling and in ressentiment towards this system of values attributed to the colonial fact and system. For the Burkinabè and the African, then, to free oneself and seize one’s sovereignty is to free oneself from one’s former executioner, which is France. It is as simple as that.
In this context, how can one be democratic without being seen as an agent of Western imperialism? For being a revolutionary and an agent of Russo-Chinese imperialism poses no problem. Being a local lackey of Russo-Chinese imperialism, encouraging the learning of Russian or Chinese and teaching our children to dance, sing, drink and dress like a Russian or a Chinese person is more “revolutionary” than speaking French or English, wearing a suit and drinking a good wine or champagne. But in truth, sovereignty as sung by our “enlighteners of conscience” has no theoretical foundation, still less a practical one. We are moving away from the real theoretical need to think the African world from within: how to dust off our culture and unearth from it the values and principles that will found a society which, in affirming its dignity, co-constructs a human identity. This is the painstaking work we have undertaken, in order to provide a purely scientific and technical answer (soon, with friends, I will form a team of motivated young researchers to do this serious work, far from useless chatter). Thinking seriously is hard; that is why many prefer to opine without thinking deeply: an opinion commits only its author. But let us not turn our opinions into scientific facts.
Argument 4 — The quest for sovereignty
The Burkinabè, like many Africans, wants to be free of colonial domination and to cherish sovereignty. Yet paradoxically, he more readily accepts Russian or Chinese influence, which is just as foreign. It is a feeling, a rejection of the former colonial executioner. How can one be a democrat without being seen as a Western agent? There lies the dissonance. For being an agent of Russo-Chinese imperialism is more readily accepted.
Cognitive dissonance explains this unease: contradictions between beliefs and behaviour produce psychological tension. The individual reduces this tension by rationalising. As David Vaidis and Séverine Halimi-Falkowicz, French researchers in social psychology, put it:
“Cognitive dissonance is a concept in social psychology that describes the unpleasant state of tension felt when a person holds cognitions that contradict one another or contradict their actions. This discomfort drives the person to reduce the dissonance by changing cognitions or behaviour, or by adding new justifications.”
To sum up my thinking: the Burkinabè love democracy but feel uneasy when it comes to defending it, because doing so creates discomfort: defending a system perceived as “imperial-Western” while claiming independence and sovereignty.
Defending democracy, here and now
I have carried out research and collected data to test methods of promoting democracy in contexts marked by terrorism, taking Burkina Faso as a starting point. I have already completed the pilot study for Nigeria, Zambia and Kenya, which I will analyse as soon as I return. I found that by presenting democracy in general terms as capable of protecting people against terrorism, unlike dictatorial regimes, I had managed to increase the Burkinabè’s propensity to defend democracy by about 9%. So it works.
For information, I analysed the number of terrorism-related deaths in 142 countries, distinguishing democratic from non-democratic regimes: I found that terrorism claims five times as many victims in non-democratic regimes as in democratic countries. Moreover, the democracies generally hit by terrorism are those with an interventionist foreign policy outside Europe.
Today, terrorism is decimating our people and strikes civilians and our valiant soldiers alike, who fight every day at the front to defend this country. We owe them respect: I believe a national day, celebrated every year, should be dedicated to them. I also propose that a register of all fallen soldiers, with their stories, be kept in a virtual museum to preserve their memory. We owe them respect and solidarity, and we must stand with the families so sorely tried.
We are also opposed to this desire to infantilise our soldiers by claiming that a simple Facebook post could demoralise them. I have known some, and I have many soldier friends (I hope they are well): I assure you these men are trained to face this kind of pressure. That is precisely why they are soldiers, men trained to face death, to defend and, if need be, to die for the people.
I would not want, on the pretext of fighting democracy and freedoms, to give the world the image of an army that is unprofessional, unable to handle the pressure of a few posts on Meta’s networks (perhaps the training has changed). Instead of infantilising our soldiers, let us remind them that they are SOLDIERS — and that says it all.
I ended my talk by expressing my regret that so many people working on democracy, conflict or terrorism know so little about my country. It does not interest them. I take this opportunity to tell our young people: let us not be naïve, the world does not care about our misfortunes. For that reason, let us build our countries strategically and lay solid foundations. Even the Africans I meet here who sympathise with the regime’s discourse would not wish to live under such a regime, even in the name of the anti-imperialist struggle. Let us stay focused, build our countries and move forward for the good of our peoples.
We can defend human rights, promote freedom of association, of thought and of the press, and fight terrorism effectively. All it takes is to train the army to take full ownership of its mission, and to educate the masses to think freely while remaining responsible for the co-construction of the nation. The role of leadership is to put the power to build this country back into the hands of the people. I am convinced of one thing: those who today call for the death penalty for those who defend freedom and justice will tomorrow be the first to fight against the system they helped to install.
Piiga, a man who loves his country, independent of the regime in place, of the context and of the stakes. My gaze is turned towards the country alone. I have always been consistent: I will fight for the people to have the freedom and the right to decide. Nothing must be imposed on them.
Souleymane Yameogo, University of Glasgow, Scotland. Madrid, quietly in my room, 00:37.
The question
How can one defend democracy in Burkina Faso without being seen as an agent of foreign powers?
Share your position and take the reflection further in the comments below.

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